ALASKA MISSILE DEFENSE WEEKLY

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE SYSTEM, JTAMDO News Volume 5, Issue 9, September 2002. Problems with the rocket motor booster has caused a postponement in Integrated Flight Test 9. Flight Test 9's rocket motors are being replaced because the concerns of damaged seals on the exhaust nozzle of the interceptor booster. A ground test last month caused the interceptor's booster nozzle to move past its design limits.

XBR

An X-band sea-based radar is being built off the coast of the Alaska. The sea-based radar will be linked to up to 10 ground based interceptors and is planned to be part of MDA's initial test bed facility. The initial phase involves the initial design work and will be complete this year. In the final phase between November 2003 and September 2005, the radar will be integrated into the GMD test bed. The radar will be built with the capability to convert to a land-based alternative and can be upgraded if tasked to become part of an operationally deployed system.

PAC-3

USD (AT&L) directed that the MDA transfer production and operations support responsibility for PAC-3 program to the Army. This is subject to congressional review. The transfer and production decisions will go through the traditional acquisition decision process with IIPTs and OIPTs.

SBIRS

SBIRS-High will consist of four satellites in Geosynchronous Orbit and two satellites in classified High Elliptical Orbits (HEO). The first HEO is scheduled to be delivered by 2003 and the following one in 2004. FY 02 funding of $88M from the Wideband Gap filler program will pay for a SBIRS-High shortfall. Gap filler is designed to fill a potential gap in the MILSATCOM capabilities or DSP and the future advanced Wideband System. SBIRS-Low program will initially produce two satellites with the possibility of eight more. The first launch will occur by 2006-2007. The satellites will provide booster launch detection, midcourse tracking and discrimination of missiles. The SBIRS-Low restructured plan is capabilities based approach to get an initial satellite capability for testing then transition into future satellite development. The final number of satellites in the constellation has not been determined

GLOBAL NEWS BREAKS #30

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2002

SENATE AUTHORIZERS SEEK FUNDING FOR REALISTIC PAC-3 TESTING, Defense Daily, September 19, 2002. Defense authorizers in the Senate are urging that the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 be tested against Scud missile targets before the PAC-3 is used in combat. $30 million has been included in the FY 03 defense authorization's classified annex so that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) can carry out these tests. Not everyone supports this initiative. The MDA claims that actual Scuds cannot be used at the PAC-3 test ranges because of safety concerns; House defense authorizers did not include funding for this; and the Army is concerned about the availability of Scuds for testing. But because Scuds are wildly erratic due to their shoddy composition, many agree that it is important to see how the PAC-3 fares against them, especially given the unexpected problems that came out during the PAC-3's operational testing earlier this year.

NEXT GMD TEST SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER, MDA SAYS, Aerospace Daily, September 23, 2002. The next test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) segment of the ballistic missile defense program is tentatively scheduled for mid to late October, according to the Missile Defense Agency. MDA officials will have a better idea about the date after an initial flight readiness review is completed in early October, MDA spokesman Lt. Col. Rick Lehner told The Daily Sept. 20 . . . The test, the first since the U.S. withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, will include all elements of the GMD system, including the space-based missile warning sensor; ground-based early warning radar; prototype X-band radar at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific; and the GMD battle management, command, control and communications system at Kwajalein Atoll and the Join National Integration Facility in Colorado Springs, Colo. . . One new wrinkle is that the test will involve the use of a Navy Aegis destroyer’s radar to track the interceptor. “We couldn’t do that before,” Lehner said. “under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, you couldn’t use any air, space or sea platform-any mobile system-to test missiles.” Lehner said the Aegis radar will simply track the interceptor and relay its flight characteristics to MDA officials on the ground. “It [won’t] play a role in guiding the interceptor to the target,” he said.

AEGIS RADAR TRACKS MISSILE IN MDA RISK REDUCTION FLIGHT TEST, Defense Daily, September 23, 2002. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) in a risk reduction flight last week for its Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program used the Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG-70) to track the missile with its SPY-1 radar for the first time, MDA officials said Friday. The test, in which MDA piggybacked on a routine Air Force Minuteman III operational test from Vandenberg AFB, Calif., allowed MDA to gather data without the expense of having to launch a separate missile, Air Force Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, an MDA spokesman, told Defense Daily. MDA, he said, was able to successfully exploit the launch of the Glory Trip 180GM Minuteman III, which was launched from Vandenberg on Sept. 19. The primary objective was to track the boosting ICBM with the Aegis radar, and all test objectives were met, Lehner said . . . Preliminary test data shows the Lake Erie tracked the Minuteman and that the Kinetic Energy Boost Battle Management Command and Control node received radar tracks from Vandenberg and the cruiser. Those fused tracks also were transmitted to the Joint National Integration Center and other MDA computer-in-the-loop facilities used for the GMD program.

AIR FORCE LOOKING FOR HOME FOR AIRBORNE LASER MISSION, Reporter-News (Abilene, Texas), September 23, 2002. The Air Force is beginning to determine which military bases, including Dyess, will qualify as candidates to house the Airborne Laser missile-defense weapon. By early 2004, the Air Force will announce a short list of bases it considers qualified to compete for the weapon, said Air Force Maj. Gen. Gary Heckman, the assistant deputy chief of staff for plans and programs. Immediately after that, environmental impact studies and a series of public hearings will begin at each location . . . As the Air Force compiles that short list, Heckman said, there’s not much Abilene can do to enhance its chances. Bill Ehrie, a former Dyess commander, disagreed. He has been a part of the contingent Abilene’s Military Affairs Committee has sent to Washington, D.C., several times the past two years to win over Air Force and congressional officials . . . Heckman said the decision will hinge on objective factors, such as having a compatible runway and taxiways along with appropriate airspace . . . In the past, Heckman said, the number of bases that qualified to compete for a weapon has ranged from a couple to more than two dozen, depending upon the weapon . . . At least two other bases are actively pursuing the ABL [Offut AFB in Omaha, Neb. and Minot AFB in North Dakota] . . . The competition could take 12-18 months, Heckman said.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RETURNS TO MOSCOW AFTER HOLDING TALKS IN U.S., TASS, September 23, 2002. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov returned to Moscow on Monday after ending his visit to New York, where he led the Russian delegation at the 57th U. N. General Assembly session . . . During the visit Igor Ivanov attended the first meeting of the Russian-American working group for strategic security on the level of foreign and defense ministers, which was held in Washington. Participants in the meeting discussed in detail some problems of transparency and cooperation in the sphere of anti-ballistic missile defense, as well as the whole range of non-proliferation problems. "Many approaches and stands of the parties concerned became clearer. We began to understand each other better," Ivanov said after the talks. "We shall look for ways to overcome the remaining differences in relations with the United States in the same constructive way."

PENTAGON: KID-CLASS WARSHIPS ARE TAIWAN'S BEST CHOICE, Central News Agency – Taiwan, September 21, 2002. The U.S.-made Kid-class destroyers are the best warships that Taiwan can obtain for the time being, a Pentagon spokesman said Friday. In defense of Washington's offer of Kid-class destroyers instead of destroyers equipped with the Aegis air defense system to Taiwan, Pentagon spokesman Jeff Davis said the anti-submarine capability of the Kidds will close the gap in Taiwan's defense needs. Even if Washington agrees to sell Aegis-equipped destroyers to Taiwan, it will take up to a decade for then to be delivered, while Taiwan's threat is more immediate than that, according to Davis. Although Aegis is thought to be good at air defense and missile defense, Kidds, after being retrofitted with newly-developed devices, also have excellent anti-submarine and air-defense capabilities, the spokesman said . . . Furthermore the SM-2 missiles on the Kidds are a significant improvement over Taiwan's current missiles. Taiwan has asked to buy four Aegis-equipped destroyers, but the Pentagon is trying to convince Taipei to settle for Kidds.

OPINION/LETTERS

DON'T PANIC!, The Jerusalem Post, September 22, 2002. For weeks we have seen a festival of hysteria and panic-mongering, and it is has not peaked yet. It is true we have to be ready for any trouble that comes, and that we have long lost our innocence as far as official announcements. But a little logic and sober thinking wouldn't hurt . . . One thing is clear: as far as Israel's defense deployment the security establishment has much better means than it did in the Gulf War and it is ready to meet an Iraqi offensive attempt. And if we are talking about defense, we all remember the trauma of our lack of adequate defense against the Iraqi Scuds during the Gulf War and the dependence we developed upon the provisional Patriot missile system that arrived at the end of the war. But since then Israel and the U.S. have developed and deployed the Arrow missile defense system. The Arrow system now grants Israel a security umbrella against even the most sophisticated missiles in the world. The system has proven itself in experiments and is considerably more effective than the Patriots it replaced. It is important to remember that the Iraqi Scuds were neither new nor very accurate during the Gulf War, and it is a fact that the apparently small number of usable missiles that remain in the Iraqi arsenal have not been renewed or improved since then. The Arrow system was designed to operate against missiles with much better capabilities than the Scuds.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2002

COUNTERMEASURES CONTRACT TO BE AWARDED, Aviation Weekly and Space Technology, September 16, 2002. As part of a renewed effort to grapple with the problems countermeasures pose to missile defense programs, the Pentagon will award a $400-500 million annual contract this May. The contractor will be in charge of developing and integrating target systems that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) would like to be increasingly complex so that testing can become more realistic. Also on the drawing board is an effort led by Boeing to develop a Complementary Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (CEKV). The CEKV would eventually replace the Raytheon kill vehicle that has been used thus far for ground-based midcourse (GMD) missile defense testing and would have active and passive sensors. MDA would prefer to use the CEKV concurrently with the sea-based midcourse system, presuming that the different kinds of sensors could pool their data and be better equipped to handle countermeasures.

U.S. READY TO COOPERATE WITH RUSSIA ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE, TASS, September 24, 2002. U.S Secretary of State Colin Powell has confirmed that the United States is ready to cooperate with Russia in strategic defense. In an exclusive interview with Itar-Tass, Powell said that he had discussed that issue with the Russian foreign and defense ministers when they were in Washington late last week. Commenting on the fact that the Russian side gave in a while ago its proposals for transparency and cooperation in strategic defense but hasn’t received any answer as of yet, Powell explained that it didn’t mean that the United States was “reluctant” to work with the Russians on those issues. He noted that the United States has always been anxious “to discuss concepts of missile defense and also to see where there are areas of cooperation in the development of such systems.” “I am confident that Secretary of Rumsfeld and Minister Sergei Ivanov will continue to pursue these issues,” Powell went on to say. Asked if that would include an opportunity for Russian companies to participate in bidding for orders, Powell replied: “I think yes.”

COMPANIES TOLD TO RECERTIFY, Baltimore Business Journal, September 20, 2002. On its Web site, Vienna, Va.-based CMS Information Services brags about posting more than $30 million in revenue in fiscal 2001 and making Inc. magazine’s list of the nation’s 500 fastest-growing companies three times in the past decade. CMS, however, still wants to be considered a small business when it comes to federal contracts. The company challenged the Missile Defense Agency’s request for Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) vendors to re-certify that they are small businesses when they submit quotes for a new automated information systems support services task order. CMS cannot do that — it has grown too large. But it maintains its 1997 certification as a small business. The certification should be valid for as long as it remains on the General Services Administration’s schedule — a list of companies that can sell directly to government agencies. The General Accounting Office, however, denied CMS’ protest Aug. 7. It ruled the Missile Defense Agency’s re-certification requirement was consistent with the agency’s intent to restrict competition for the contract to small businesses. GAO General Counsel Anthony H. Gamboa says MDA’s request for updated small-business certifications was “particularly reasonable” because the “extremely long duration” of GSA schedule contracts — potentially as long as 21 years in CMS’ case — increases “the likelihood that work will be performed by a vendor that is not a small business at the time of performance.”

SBIRS-HIGH FACES DELAYS IF FUNDING CUT IN SENATE LEGISLATION PREVAILS, DOD SAYS, Aerospace Daily, September 24, 2002. The Defense Department is warning that a Senate-passed $100 million cut in the Air Force budget request for the Space Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) would delay the program by up to 18 months and increase the chances of a gap in the nation’s missile launch warning capability . . . In an appeal to the House-Senate conference committee charges with crafting the bill, DOD wrote that the $100 million cut would delay SBIRS-High’s operational capability by 12-18 months because it would postpone the development and testing of critical software . . . A 12- to 18-month delay in SBIRS-High could cause “unacceptable gaps in our missile launch warning capability,” especially if one of the final two DSP satellites experiences a launch failure, the appeal says. “Such gaps would significantly degrade our ability to detect, track and identify attacks against the U.S., reduce leadership decision timelines in the event of attack, jeopardize the survivability of U.S. land-based strategic forces, and severely degrade national and theater missile defenses,” DOD wrote.

“POWER AND VALUES,” National Review Online, September 18, 2002. A conversation with Condoleezza Rice toward the end of the day on July 16: Jay Nordlinger sat down with Condoleezza Rice, the president’s national-security adviser, in her West Wing office . . . By now, obviously, Condi Rice needs no introduction . . .

JN: Are we going to go ahead with missile defense?

CR: Yes.

JN: Committed?

CR: Committed. It’s one of the critical ways that you deal with the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And an American president — and it won’t be this president, most likely, because many of the best technologies are in the future — an American president should have an array of defensive technologies to deal with [the problem of nuclear missiles]. But if this president doesn’t get going and research, develop, and deploy what we can, it won’t be there for the next president.

JOINT NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER IN DOD’S FUTURE, CHU SAYS, American Forces Press Service, September 20, 2002. To make interoperability a reality among the U.S. military services, a Joint National Training Center will be established in two years, DoD’s senior civilian readiness official said. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is convinced future military operations will become increasingly joint-service in character, David Chu, undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness, noted Sept. 17 in an address at a conference in Alexandria, VA. “The secretary firmly believes while we have made great progress in terms of joint training over the last two or three decades, … we still have a long way to go,” Chu said. This situation, he said, reinforces the need for the new joint national training center that’s slated to start up by Oct. 1, 2004 . . . Joint training among the services, however, has most often been achieved over the years during actual military operations, Chu noted.

OPINION/LETTERS

TRANSFORMATION OR IDEOLOGY?, Defense News, September 23-29, 2002 . . . There are important flaws in the way the Pentagon is pursuing transformation that raise doubts about its long-term benefits. First of all, transformation is said to be “capabilities-based” rather than threat-based. The result is that it favors lowest-common-denominator technologies like networks that can be plugged into any conceivable scenario. But a close look at how the Pentagon plans to use the new technologies reveals implicit assumptions about future threats, assumptions that make the technology look more robust than it really is. Clever adversaries won’t have much difficulty coping with many of the systems currently deemed transformational. Second, it is unsettling to see policy-makers with limited technical credentials making such bold claims for the transformative power of emerging technology . . . Third, the internal Pentagon processes shaping transformation exclude many of the players with a stake in the outcome, including those with the greatest operational and technological expertise . . . Fourth, because key choices are being made in isolation from the organizations that will implement them, there is little likelihood they will survive beyond the tenure of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld . . . Finally, and most ominously, transformation has become the latest pretext for deferring modernization of the nation’s military arsenal . . . Unless it reconnects with reality, history will remember transformation as a costly distraction rather than a revolutionary paradigm shift. Loren Thompson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, Arlington, VA.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2002

MOSCOW PROPOSES US-RUSSIAN MISSILE SHIELD, DISARMAMENT TALKS THIS AUTUMN, Agence France Presse, September 25, 2002. Russia has proposed that Russian-US working parties on missile defense and strategic offensive arms reduction hold their first meetings in Moscow in late October or early November, the Russian foreign ministry said in a statement early Wednesday . . . The working parties were set up during the visit of Russian foreign and defense ministers Igor Ivanov and Sergei Ivanov to Washington last week, [Russian deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Yakovenko said]. Yakovenko also proposed that Moscow and Washington start talks on military activities in space, although he failed to specify a date. In June, Washington officially walked out of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty and announced it was moving ahead with plans to deploy a missile defense system. Moscow initially voiced strong opposition to Washington’s plans but later considerably softened its stance . . . Russia last June tore up the 1993 START II arms reduction treaty, which had largely been superseded by the Putin-Bush deal and which Moscow considered irrelevant following Washington’s decision to forge ahead with the construction of its missile shield.

GAO: CHALLENGES REMAIN FOR DOD SPACE PLANNING, Aerospace Daily, September 25, 2002. The Department of Defense faces “substantial planning and acquisition challenges” in its efforts to strengthen the management and organization of its space activities, including its space surveillance network, Global Positioning System satellites and space systems controls, the General Accounting Office said in a new report. DOD is developing a space control strategy to outline objectives, tasks and capabilities for the next two decades, the GAO said. That strategy could be completed next year, although GAO said it may not be finished until 2003 . . . DOD also should develop an agency-wide investment plan to guide the services’ budgets for space, according to the report. Doing so will be a “considerable” challenge because “it will require the services to forego some of their authority to set priorities,” the report said. It said DOD should use new acquisition policies to make sure space programs don’t experience large cost increases, such as its Space Based Infrared System program did. It should make sure program requirements don’t outstrip resources, and establish “measures for success at each stage” of the development process, according to the report. DOD agreed with the recommendations, the GAO said.

DOD ENDORSES HOUSE PROPOSALS FOR ACQUISITION REFORM, Aerospace Daily, September 25, 2002. The Defense Department has given a qualified endorsement to two House-passed provisions aimed at giving DOD more flexibility in managing acquisition programs . . . One provision would allow the defense secretary to move up to $20 million a year from a program’s procurement budget to its research and development account when problems in the program arise suddenly. DOD’s authority to transfer funds would be limited to a total of $250 million a year, and the department would have to notify Congress 30 days before shifting funds. However, DOD urged the conference committee to drop the requirement for a 30 day waiting period, saying it runs counter to the House provision’s goal of quickly resolving last-minute problems. The other provision would create a “challenge” program allowing companies and individuals to propose inserting new technologies into existing acquisition programs. DOD wrote an appeal expressing support for the idea. But DOD said the provision should be revised to limit challenges to components and subsystems, because challenges to entire systems could be too disruptive.

RATIFY, NOT KILL OFF, Defense And Security, September 25, 2002. All documents on ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Potentials [the] presidents of Russia and the United States signed in Moscow this May will be forwarded to the Duma in the nearest future, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Georgy Mamedov said. According to the official, the delay with offering the document for ratification is ascribed to “the procedure of budget forming”. The hearing on the Treaty is planned for early October. According to the Foreign Ministry, Americans intend to complete ratification procedures this November. Mamedov assumes that Russian lawmakers will do so somewhat later. He says that the Treaty will be confirmed by the Federal Assembly by the end of 2002 but nobody can rule out the possibility that deputies may have their own ideas on the matter. The Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie presents considerations of prominent Russian experts and specialists in the field.

POLAND TO TAKE ADVISORY ROLE WITH NEW NATO MEMBERS, American Forces Press Service, September 24, 2002. Poland will play an important role in advising the military of any new nations accepted into NATO, a senior U.S. defense official said here Sept. 23. U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld met with Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski and other senior officials Sept. 23, the official told reporters at a background briefing. The meeting included discussions on the U.S.- Polish military-to-military relationship and other issues, he said . . . The Polish military, like the U.S. armed forces, is undergoing major restructuring and transformation, the official noted. Close U.S.-Polish military cooperation, particularly in the area of transformation, is to the two nations’ mutual advantage, he said. That’s why the United States and Poland developed a military cooperation initiative involving air, land and sea forces, he said. In addition, the two nations may also cooperate in other areas, such as missile defense and establishing military transformational training centers, he added.

IRAN STARTS MASS PRODUCTION OF MISSILES, Reuters, September 25, 2002. Iran, accused by the United States of developing weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, has begun the mass production of a new surface-to-surface missile, newspapers said Wednesday. They said Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani inaugurated a production line for the Fateh A-110 surface-to-surface missile which has a range of 130 miles as well as an anti-ship missile and 35mm anti-aircraft shells. “Iran’s deterrence policy in producing defensive equipment aims to bring maximum security to the Islamic Republic’s borders,” the Siyasat-e Rouz newspaper quoted Shamkhani as saying. Iran successfully tested the Fateh A-110 missile in September. “Iran has no plan to increase the range of its missiles and Iran’s missile programs are fully in line with international principles,” he said. Defense Ministry officials were not immediately available to confirm the reports carried in several newspapers . . . Iran has developed a range of missiles, tanks and jet fighters mainly with the help of Russia, China and North Korea. The United States has urged those countries stop arms cooperation with the Islamic Republic.

BLAIR SAYS IRAQIS COULD LAUNCH CHEMICAL WARHEADS IN MINUTES, New York Times, September 25, 2002. Britain asserted today that the Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussein could launch chemical or biological warheads within 45 minutes of an order to use them and acquire a nuclear weapon in one to five years. The claims were made in a 50-page report intended to bolster the Bush administration’s case against the Iraqi leader and released today a few hours before Prime Minister Tony Blair outlined to British lawmakers his case for war if necessary to make Iraq disarm . . . The report said Mr. Hussein had retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles, with a range of 650 kilometers (400 miles), capable of carrying chemical or biological weapons, and it published a map showing that Iraqi weapons under development could reach the whole of the Arab Middle East, Israel, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2002

ISRAEL DEPLOYS MORE PATRIOT BATTERIES, Philadelphia Inquirer, September 12, 2002. Israel deploys more Patriot batteries Israel has deployed three more Patriot batteries to protect its citizens against Scud attacks if the United States goes to war with Iraq. The missiles fielded are not the same as the ones being developed by the United States for its missile defense program, which are the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missiles. The Israeli Patriots were created for air defense so they may not work effectively in a missile defense capacity. Israel also has the Arrow Weapon System (AWS), a joint effort between the United States and Israel to provide the latter with a terminal phase missile defense system. The Arrow has never been tested against Scuds, nor has it been used in combat, so its efficacy against Iraq's arsenal is uncertain.

MDA LIGHTER THAN AIR, HIGH ALTITUDE AIRSHIP, Space & Missile, September 26, 2002. The Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, is looking for a industry partner to support the design and production of a Lighter than Air, High Altitude Airship Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration prototype (HAA-ACTD), according to an announcement posted on the Federal Business Opportunities web site Sept. 20. The objective of this ACTD is to demonstrate the engineering feasibility and potential military utility of an unmanned, un-tethered, gas filled, solar powered airship that can fly at 70,000 feet, the FBO announcement said. The prototype airship developed under this effort will be capable of continuous flight for up to one month while carrying a multi-mission payload. This ACTD is intended as a developmental step toward an objective HAA that can self deploy from the continental United States to worldwide locations.

ARMY AWARDS $626 MILLION CONTRACT FOR MISSILE SITE, Associated Press, September 25, 2002. A new company formed by Bechtel Corp. and Lockheed Martin won a $626 million contract to operate the South Pacific site where the Alabama-based Army Space and Missile Defense Command conducts missile tests . . . Kwajalein Range Services, composed of Bechtel National and Lockheed Martin, will operate the Kwajalein Atoll-Reagan Test Site, located in the Marshall Islands some 4,700 miles from the West Coast. Some 2,600 contractors will provide everything from air transportation to garbage pickup for the atoll, where about 100 Army personnel are based . . . Missile interceptors are fired from the atoll at target missiles launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, [Bill Congo, a spokesman for the missile command at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville] said. Another defense contractor, Raytheon Co., previously operated the Kwajalein facility, he said.

BECHTEL-LOCKHEED TEAM WINS $626 MILLION KWAJALEIN OPS AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACT, InsideDefense.com, September 25, 2002. The Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command has awarded a $626 million, four-year contract to a team led by Bechtel Corp. and Lockheed Martin to manage the Kwajalein Atoll missile defense test site . . . Kwajalein Range Services is the joint venture between Bechtel and Lockheed that “will provide technical services for the missile testing and space surveillance missions as well as complete logistics and infrastructure solutions to support the U. S. Army Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site community,” a Bechtel statement reads. “These logistics services include procurement and supply, power, water, facility and housing maintenance, schools, recreation, retail, post office, telecommunications, and sea and air transportation.” Located in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Kwajalein Atoll/Reagan Test Site is designed primarily for ballistic missile defense testing and space surveillance operations. Prototype interceptor missiles are launched from Kwajalein at ballistic missile targets shot from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

RUMSFELD ENCOURAGES LEGISLATIVE CHANGES, OUTLINES DOD PRIORITIES, Inside the Pentagon, September 26, 2002. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week urged top service, defense agency and Joint Staff officials to ask for help if their ability to accomplish important goals is inhibited by what they view as unneeded laws. Proposed changes should hew to the Pentagon’s most important priorities, outlined in a “top 10” list accompanying Rumsfeld’s Sept. 17 memo. “Every week it seems, a senior official in this department tells me we are constrained in our ability to do something by an obsolete legal provision,” Rumsfeld writes. “Similarly, I often hear of initiatives we would like to take, but for which we need additional statutory authority.” Accordingly, he tells his senior lieutenants that as they develop ideas for the Defense Department’s next round of proposed legislative changes, they should “adopt the perspective that now is the time to change the way we operate. If you need specific legal authority to accomplish an important goal, or if you need relief from an unnecessary legal restriction, please ask for it.”

IRAN: NEW MISSILE ON THE ASSEMBLY LINE, New York Times, September 26, 2002. The military has begun the mass production of a new surface-to-surface missile, newspapers reported. They said Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani had inaugurated a production line for the Fateh A-110 missile, which was tested successfully earlier this month and has a range of 130 miles, as well as an antiship missile. President Bush has labeled Iran part of an “axis of evil,” accusing it of seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring terrorism — charges that Iran strongly denies, saying its weapons program is strictly conventional and for defensive purposes only.

INDIA TEST-FIRES TRISHUL MISSILE FROM MOBILE LAUNCHER, Aerospace Daily, September 26, 2002. India test-fired its short-range air defense Trishul missile from the eastern state of Orissa on Sept. 24. The missile, which is being developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), was tested from a mobile launcher, said Pradipto Bandyopadhyay, a spokesman for the Indian ministry of defense. In January, the missile was tested in sea-skimming mode against low-flying targets. The solid-fuel Trishul has a range of 9 kilometers (5.6 miles) and can carry a 15-kilogram (33 pound) warhead. The missile, which is part of the country’s integrated guided missile development program, is about three meters (9.9 feet) long and can fly at supersonic speeds. After previous tests, the Indian army asked for some basic redesigning of the Trishul, which the army plans to use as a defense against tanks.

BRIEFINGS

SECRETARY RUMSFELD’S PRESS CONFERENCE IN WARSAW, POLAND, September 25, 2002.

Q: On the scale from one to ten when one means tougher disappointment and ten supernatural contentment, which number would define your mood of this meeting [with NATO members in Warsaw, Poland]?. . . And could you tell us about progress of SDI program? . . .

Rumsfeld: . . . I came away from this meeting very, very high. I would say it’s up in the nine and ten levels. I think it’s been an excellent meeting. We’ve had good discussions . . . The response to our proposal with respect to a NATO response force has been broadly positive. I’ve been very pleased . . . With respect to the, I think you said SDI, the threat of ballistic missiles. If we’ve learned anything it’s that the terrorist networks that exist in the world and terrorist states avoid attacking armies, navies or air forces and look for areas of vulnerability. They fashioned so-called asymmetric threats that don’t require their going after armies, navies and air forces. That means that clearly ballistic missiles are a threat, cruise missiles are increasingly a threat, terrorism is a threat. We’ll undoubtedly be seeing countries that are heavily dependent on technology such as the United States and the Western European nations . . . So what we’ve seen is a growing understanding of that, that those are the kinds of circumstances we’re going to have to face in the 21st Century, and as a result we’re proceeding with our missile defense program and other countries are interested in discussing various aspects of it with us, and I suspect we’ll see continued improvements in the ability to deal with those asymmetrical threats. Terrorism, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, cyber attacks and the like.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2002

U.S. OFFERS TURKEY ROLE IN NATO MISSILE DEFENSE, Middle East Newsline, September 26, 2002. The United States has offered Turkey a major role in a NATO missile defense system. Turkish officials said the U.S. Defense Department has held a series of briefings for Turkish and other NATO envoys on Washington’s proposal for a missile defense umbrella. The officials said Washington’s offer was for a regional missile defense system that would protect NATO allies throughout Europe. The U.S. offer calls for NATO allies to cooperate with Washington in establishing a network of air and missile defense assets that would protect Europe from an attack from the Middle East or North Korea. Turkish officials said the U.S. proposal was first presented to Turkey in late July and then discussed with other NATO allies last week. Under the proposal, Turkey would be recruited in an industry effort to provide early-warning and other systems for the missile defense umbrella. The officials said the Bush administration has not discussed specifics on funding and technical cooperation.

NEW REPORT DETAILS CHINESE MISSILE DEFENSE COUNTERMEASURES, Global Security Newswire, September 25, 2002. Although the development of Chinese missile defense countermeasures is not likely to keep pace with U.S. technologies, the United States should still monitor China’s efforts, says a report released this week by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Building on years of research, China has created a broad program to develop countermeasures to defeat a U.S. missile defense system, according to a chapter in the report, China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles and Conventional Capabilities . . . Countermeasures developers have focused on two main avenues, counter surveillance and counter intercept, the report says. The counter surveillance strategy is designed to prevent U.S. sensors from detecting ballistic missiles and their warheads, the report says. To this end, China has worked to develop passive electronic countermeasures such as chaff to confuse X-Band radar systems and active electronic countermeasures such as radar jammers . . . China has worked on several measures to block interceptors from engaging targets. One method that has been examined is the use of multiple warheads, the report says, adding that China has researched multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology since the 1970s . . . China also has several other missile defense countermeasures under consideration, including non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, anti-satellite measures and anti-radiation missiles, according to the report . . . China has also conducted research on anti-satellite measures since the 1960s, according to the report. To counter a missile defense system, ASAT measures would be directed against satellite systems in low-Earth orbit — for example, the Space Based Infrared System-Low system — or in highly elliptical orbits — for example, SBIRS-High.

MISSILE TEST SOON, Washington Times, September 27, 2002. China is preparing to conduct a flight test of its new Dong Feng-31 intercontinental ballistic missile, according to intelligence officials. The preparations were detected by a U.S. spy satellite at the Wuzhai missile test center in central China. China is working hard on the DF-31, the first truck-mounted ICBM in the world since Russia’s SS-25. A flight test in January of a DF-31 failed, officials said. On Aug. 28, China also flight-tested a Dong Feng-4 ICBM. That missile test coincided with the visit to China by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. China also recently tested a new short-range missile - part of the buildup of advanced missiles opposite Taiwan, where about 350 to 400 missiles threaten the island.

U.S. MAY DEBUT NEW CRUISE MISSILE IN IRAQ, Space & Missile, September 26, 2002. The anticipated war on Iraq may mark the debut of a stealthy cruise missile that has been in development for seven years, according to a former top-testing official for the Navy. The Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) is a $3 billion Air Force/Navy program to create a stealthy “standoff” munition that can be launched by an aircraft beyond the range of enemy air defenses. That capability may be particularly important in Iraq, considering the density of Saddam Hussein’s air defenses . . . Built by Lockheed Martin, JASSM has a stealthy airframe that makes it particularly able to penetrate air defenses. The missile cruises up to 200 miles to its target using an anti-jam Global Positioning System (GPS) navigation system and an infrared seeker. It has a 2,000-pound blast-fragmentation warhead with a penetrator that can plow through hardened targets. Once deployed, it will be launched from a range of aircraft, including Air Force bombers like the B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit and B-52 Stratofortress, as well as the Navy’s F/A-18 Hornet strike aircraft.

MILITANTS ARE SAID TO AMASS MISSILES IN SOUTH LEBANON, New York Times, September 27, 2002. Hezbollah militants in southern Lebanon have amassed thousands of surface-to-surface rockets, including missiles with the range to strike cities in northern Israel, according to senior Israeli and Western officials . . . Western and Israeli security officials say most of Hezbollah’s rockets have been provided by Iran, one of Israel’s staunchest enemies. The officials said that thousands of rockets were flown to the Syrian capital of Damascus and driven by truck to southern Lebanon. Israeli security officials said that Syria has now begun to send rockets of its own . . . Officials worry that the buildup of so many rockets could tempt Hezbollah to expand its operations. Adding to this worry is the fear that Iran or Syria might encourage Hezbollah to stir up tensions along Israel’s northern frontier to divert attention from Iraq and complicate the Bush administration’s plans to topple Saddam Hussein . . . According to Israeli and Western officials, Hezbollah has accumulated 8,000 to 9,000 Katyusha rockets, with a range of about 12 miles. But in the past year, Israeli officials have begun to warn that Iran is also providing longer-range systems, including the 240-millimeter Fajr-3 missile, with a range of about 25 miles and the 333-millimeter Fajr-5 missile, with a range of about 45 miles, meaning it could strike the northern Israeli city of Haifa, and areas to the south, from southern Lebanon. Israeli officials say that Hezbollah has several hundred Fajr rockets. American officials have acknowledged that Hezbollah has the Fajr systems, but have been cautious in specifying how many the group controls. Syria has also begun to provide 222-millimeter rockets, which have a range of 12 to 18 miles.

NORTHERN COMMAND TO ASSUME DEFENSE DUTIES OCT. 1, American Forces Press Service, September 25, 2002. A page in history will turn Oct. 1 as U.S. Northern Command stands up at Peterson Air Force Base, Colo. NORTHCOM, created as part of changes to the Unified Command Plan, will be the combatant command for defense of the United States. Air Force Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, current commander of U.S. Space Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, will head NORTHCOM . . . The establishment of NORTHCOM is part of the greatest transformation of the Unified Command Plan since its inception in 1947, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said during the April 17 unveiling of the command. The command will be responsible for the defense of the American homeland. NORTHCOM’s area of operations will include the United States, Canada, Mexico, parts of the Caribbean and the contiguous waters in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans up to 500 miles off the North American coastline.

AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE, JTAMDO News Volume 5, Issue 9, September 2002. Flight Mission 4 (FM-4) is still scheduled for fall 2002. The objective of FM-4 is to conduct an ascent phase engagement against a stressing unitary ballistic missile target. The ascent phase is the first 500 to 600 seconds of the TBM flight trajectory. An ascent engagement is preferable to an engagement later in the trajectory because the quicker a missile defense system can destroy a threat missile, the larger area it can defend. In addition, it allows less time for the enemy missiles to deploy countermeasures. A key test objective of FM-4 will be the performance of the Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS), which uses small thrusters to steer the kinetic interceptor toward the threat missile. For FM-4, the DACS will be in sustaining mode and so it will stay at a constant rate of thrust. FM-5 and FM-6 (Spring/Summer 2003) will implement the new fully operational multipulse DACS. Based on the two intercepts as the criteria for success, MDA and Navy are looking to potentially accelerate Aegis BMD fielding schedule. The earliest deployment possible is 2006. The Navy is creating a program, Standard Missile 5, to develop an over-the-horizon air defense missile that could be initially be used to shoot down aircraft and cruise missiles beyond line-of-sight. The extended range missile would have an active seeker and a range of 200 plus nautical miles that potentially could be used for a sea-based program to defend against ballistic missiles in their terminal phase. Boost Phase Segment Airborne Laser (ABL) test aircraft is continuing to undergo extensive testing on the air and in the ground. Currently the aircraft is undergoing functional checks to verify aerodynamic performance and a checkout of its surveillance system. The flight profile will be expanded to include tests of the ABL aircraft's battle management system and will include detection and tracking of missile flights from White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The Boeing 747-400 will fly to Edwards Air Force Base, California at the end of the year for the next phase of the program. At Edwards, the ABL aircraft will get its targeting system, optics and tracking and high energy laser system installed. The Air Force is examining concepts for a Directed Energy High Powered Microwave (HPM). HPM will be used to suppress enemy air defense and disable C2 nodes. HPM is designed for use with UAVs and cruise missiles such as the Tomahawk and JASM. Another concept under review is the high-powered solid-state laser on board the Joint Strike Fighter (notionally with 100 kw of power). Fielding is estimated to occur in about eight to ten years. The Air Force Research Lab will initially demonstrate a 25 kw laser that could be scaled to 100 kw.

IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

FOREWORD BY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONOURABLE TONY BLAIR MP

The document published today is based, in large part, on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC is at the heart of the British intelligence machinery. It is chaired by the Cabinet Office and made up of the heads of the UK’s three Intelligence and Security Agencies, the Chief of Defense Intelligence, and senior officials from key government departments. For over 60 years the JIC has provided regular assessments to successive Prime Ministers and senior colleagues on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues. Its work, like the material it analyses, is largely secret. It is unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest. In recent months, I have been increasingly alarmed by the evidence from inside Iraq that despite sanctions, despite the damage done to his capability in the past, despite the UN Security Council Resolutions expressly outlawing it, and despite his denials, Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world. Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam’s is one of the most secretive and dictatorial regimes in the world. So I believe people will understand why the Agencies cannot be specific about the sources, which have formed the judgments in this document, and why we cannot publish everything we know. We cannot, of course, publish the detailed raw intelligence. I and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on the intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority. I also want to pay tribute to our Intelligence and Security Services for the often extraordinary work that they do.

What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile program. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors. The picture presented to me by the JIC in recent months has become more not less worrying. It is clear that, despite sanctions, the policy of containment has not worked sufficiently well to prevent Saddam from developing these weapons. I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped.

Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, but against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. I am quite clear that Saddam will go to extreme lengths, indeed has already done so, to hide these weapons and avoid giving them up. In today’s inter-dependent world, a major regional conflict does not stay confined to the region in question. Faced with someone who has shown himself capable of using WMD, I believe the international community has to stand up for itself and ensure its authority is upheld.

The threat posed to international peace and security, when WMD are in the hands of a brutal and aggressive regime like Saddam’s, is real. Unless we face up to the threat, not only do we risk undermining the authority of the UN, whose resolutions he defies, but more importantly and in the longer term, we place at risk the lives and prosperity of our own people. The case I make is that the UN Resolutions demanding he stops his WMD program are being flouted; that since the inspectors left four years ago he has continued with this programmed; that the inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international community will have to act. I believe that faced with the information available to me, the UK Government has been right to support the demands that this issue be confronted and dealt with. We must ensure that he does not get to use the weapons he has, or get hold of the weapons he wants.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighboring countries with these weapons and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people. Following the Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass destruction.

2. Much information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to Iraq’s continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them.

3. An independent and well-researched overview of this public evidence was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.

4. As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional information is available to the Government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. However, it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq’s regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).

5. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programs.

6. As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has continued to produce chemical and biological agents; military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them; command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is intelligence that he may have delegated this authority to his son Qusai); developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents; pursued illegal programs to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programs; tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no active civil nuclear power program that could require it; recalled specialists to work on its nuclear program; illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads; started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations; started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations; constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq’s Gulf neighbors and Israel; pursued illegal program to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles; learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors.

7. These judgments reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgments and on the development of the JIC’s assessments since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this paper.

8. Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international law. Under a series of UN Security Council Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings of these weapons under the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarizes the history of the UN inspection regime and Iraq’s history of deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.

9. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines in Part 3 Saddam’s rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Saddam’s human rights abuses are also catalogued, including his record of torture, mass arrests and summary executions.

10. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programmed. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated illegal income of some $3 billion in 2001.

PART 1: IRAQ’S CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

1. Since UN inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq in 1998, there has been little overt information on Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Much of the publicly available information about Iraqi capabilities and intentions is dated. But we also have available a range of secret intelligence about these programs and Saddam Hussein’s intentions. This comes principally from the United Kingdom’s intelligence and analysis agencies – the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Security Service, and the Defense Intelligence Staff (DIS). We also have access to intelligence from close allies.

Intelligence rarely offers a complete account of activities which are designed to remain concealed. The nature of Saddam’s regime makes Iraq a difficult target for the intelligence services. Intelligence, however, has provided important insights into Iraqi programs and Iraqi military thinking. Taken together with what is already known from other sources, this intelligence builds our understanding of Iraq’s capabilities and adds significantly to the analysis already in the public domain. But intelligence sources need to be protected, and this limits the detail that can be made available.

3. Iraq’s capabilities have been regularly reviewed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which has provided advice to the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues on the developing assessment, drawing on all available sources. Part 1 of this paper includes some of the most significant views reached by the JIC between 1999 and 2002.

4. Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) The JIC is a Cabinet Committee with a history dating back to 1936. The JIC brings together the Heads of the three Intelligence and Security Agencies (Secret Intelligence Service, Government Communications Headquarters and the Security Service), the Chief of Defense Intelligence, senior policy makers from the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Home Office, the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry and representatives from other Government Departments and Agencies as appropriate. The JIC provides regular intelligence assessments to the Prime Minister, other Ministers and senior officials on a wide range of foreign policy and international security issues. It meets each week in the Cabinet Office.

CHAPTER 2: IRAQ’S PROGRAMMES: 1971–1998

1. Iraq has been involved in chemical and biological warfare research for over 30 years. Its chemical warfare research started in 1971 at a small, well guarded site at Rashad to the north east of Baghdad. Research was conducted there on a number of chemical agents including mustard gas, CS and tabun. Later, in 1974 a dedicated organization called al-Hasan Ibn al-Haitham was established. In the late 1970s plans were made to build a large research and commercial-scale production facility in the desert some 70km north west of Baghdad under the cover of Project 922. This was to become Muthanna State Establishment, also known as al-Muthanna, and operated under the front name of Iraq’s State Establishment for Pesticide Production. It became operational in 1982-83. It had five research and development sections, each tasked to pursue different programs. In addition, the al-Muthanna site was the main chemical agent production facility, and it also took the lead in weaponizing chemical and biological agents including all aspects of weapon development and testing, in association with the military. According to information, subsequently supplied by the Iraqis, the total production capacity in 1991 was 4,000 tons of agent per annum, but we assess it could have been higher. Al-Muthanna was supported by three separate storage and precursor production facilities known as Fallujah 1, 2 and 3 near Habbaniyah, north west of Baghdad, parts of which were not completed before they were heavily bombed in the 1991 Gulf War.

Effects of Chemical Weapons Mustard is a liquid agent, which gives off a hazardous vapor, causing burns and blisters to exposed skin. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhea. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs.

Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrams of VX on the skin can cause rapid death.

2. Iraq started biological warfare research in the mid-1970s. After small-scale research, a purpose-built research and development facility was authorized at al-Salman, also known as Salman Pak. This is surrounded on three sides by the Tigris River and situated some 35km south of Baghdad. Although some progress was made in biological weapons research at this early stage, Iraq decided to concentrate on developing chemical agents and their delivery systems at al-Muthanna. With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, in the early 1980s, the biological weapons programmed was revived. The appointment of Dr Rihab Taha in 1985, to head a small biological weapons research team at al-Muthanna, helped to develop the programmed. At about the same time plans were made to develop the Salman Pak site into a secure biological warfare research facility. Dr Taha continued to work with her team at al-Muthanna until 1987 when it moved to Salman Pak, which was under the control of the Directorate of General Intelligence. Significant resources were provided for the programmed, including the construction of a dedicated production facility (Project 324) at al-Hakam. Agent production began in 1988 and weaponization testing and later filling of munitions was conducted in association with the staff at Muthanna State Establishment. From mid-1990, other civilian facilities were taken over and some adapted for use in the production and research and development of biological agents. These included: al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute which produced botulinum toxin and conducted virus research. There is some intelligence to suggest that work was also conducted on anthrax; al-Fudaliyah Agriculture and Water Research Center where Iraq admitted it undertook aflatoxin production and genetic engineering; Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Institute which was used for the storage of biological agent seed stocks and was involved in genetic engineering.

The effects of biological agents

Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium Bacillus Anthracis. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary, but can include fever and internal bleeding. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

Botulinum toxin is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of poisoning may appear as early as 1-hour post exposure or as late as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.

Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Most symptoms take a long time to show. Food products contaminated by aflatoxins can cause liver inflammation and cancer. They can also affect pregnant women, leading to stillborn babies and children born with mutations.

Ricin is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ failure leading to death within one or two days of inhalation.

By the time of the Gulf War Iraq was producing very large quantities of chemical and biological agents. From a series of Iraqi declarations to the UN during the 1990s we know that by 1991 they had produced at least: 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, 8,500 liters of anthrax, 2,200 liters of aflatoxin and were working on a number of other agents; 2,850 tons of mustard gas, 210 tons of tabun, 795 tons of sarin and cyclosarin, and 3.9 tons of VX.

Iraq’s nuclear programmed was established under the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission in the 1950s. Under a nuclear co-operation agreement signed with the Soviet Union in 1959, a nuclear research center, equipped with a research reactor, was built at Tuwaitha, the main Iraqi nuclear research center. The research reactor worked up to 1991. The surge in Iraqi oil revenues in the early 1970s supported an expansion of the research programmed. This was bolstered in the mid-1970s by the acquisition of two research reactors powered by highly enriched uranium fuel and equipment for fuel fabrication and handling. By the end of 1984 Iraq was self-sufficient in uranium ore. One of the reactors was destroyed in an Israeli air attack in June 1981 shortly before it was to become operational; the other was never completed.

By the mid-1980s the deterioration of Iraq’s position in the war with Iran prompted renewed interest in the military use of nuclear technology. Additional resources were put into developing technologies to enrich uranium as fissile material (material that makes up the core of a nuclear weapon) for use in nuclear weapons. Enriched uranium was preferred because it could be more easily produced covertly than the alternative, plutonium. Iraq followed parallel programs to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) and gas centrifuge enrichment. By 1991 one EMIS enrichment facility was nearing completion and another was under construction. However, Iraq never succeeded in its EMIS technology and the programmed had been dropped by 1991. Iraq decided to concentrate on gas centrifuges as the means for producing the necessary fissile material. Centrifuge facilities were also under construction, but the centrifuge design was still being developed. In August 1990 Iraq instigated a crash program to develop a single nuclear weapon within a year. This program envisaged the rapid development of a small 50 machine gas centrifuge cascade to produce weapons-grade HEU using fuel from the Soviet research reactor, which was already substantially enriched, and unused fuel from the reactor bombed by the Israelis. By the time of the Gulf War, the crash program had made little progress.

Iraq’s declared aim was to produce a missile warhead with a 20-kiloton yield and weapons designs were produced for the simplest implosion weapons. These were similar to the device used at Nagasaki in 1945. Iraq was also working on more advanced concepts. By 1991 the program was supported by a large body of Iraqi nuclear expertise, program documentation and databases and manufacturing infrastructure. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iraq had: experimented with high explosives to produce implosive shock waves; invested significant effort to understand the various options for neutron initiators; made significant progress in developing capabilities for the production, casting and machining of uranium metal.

Effect of a 20-kiloton nuclear detonation

A detonation of a 20-kiloton nuclear warhead over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles. Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties.

SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing on the technology of the German V-2 developed in World War II. For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed ballistic missile industry. Many of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi modified version of the SCUD missile, the al-Hussein, with an extended range of 650km. Iraq had about 250 imported SCUD-type missiles prior to the Gulf War plus an unknown number of indigenously produced engines and components. Iraq was working on other stretched SCUD variants, such as the al-Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse-engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles. Recent intelligence indicates that they may have succeeded at that time. In particular, Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multistage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the al-Abid. Also during this period, Iraq was developing the Badr-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR- 2 programmed run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200–1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.

The use of chemical and biological weapons

Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons during the Iran- Iraq War. Many of the casualties are still in Iranian hospitals suffering from the long-term effects of numerous types of cancer and lung diseases. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja in northern Iraq (see box on p15). Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed.

3. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin during the war with Iran resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. A month after the attack on Halabja, Iraqi troops used over 100 tons of sarin against Iranian troops on the al-Fao peninsula. Over the next three months Iraqi troops used sarin and other nerve agents on Iranian troops causing extensive casualties.

4. From Iraqi declarations to the UN after the Gulf War we know that by 1991 Iraq had produced a variety of delivery means for chemical and biological agents including over 16,000 free-fall bombs and over 110,000 artillery rockets and shells. Iraq also admitted to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) that it had 50 chemical and 25 biological warheads available for its ballistic missiles.

The use of ballistic missiles

5. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War at both civilian and military targets, and 93 SCUD-type missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region.

6. At the end of the Gulf War the international community was determined that Iraq’s arsenal of chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles should be dismantled. The method chosen to achieve this was the establishment of UNSCOM to carry out intrusive inspections within Iraq and to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with a range of over 150km. The IAEA was charged with the abolition of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmed. Between 1991 and 1998 UNSCOM succeeded in identifying and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as well as associated production facilities. The IAEA also destroyed the infrastructure for Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmed and removed key nuclear materials. This was achieved despite a continuous and sophisticated programmed of harassment, obstruction, deception and denial (see Part 2). Because of this UNSCOM concluded by 1998 that it was unable to fulfill its mandate. The inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998.

7. Based on the UNSCOM report to the UN Security Council in January 1999 and earlier UNSCOM reports, we assess that when the UN inspectors left Iraq they were unable to account for: up to 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tons of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals, including approximately 300 tons which, in the Iraqi chemical warfare programmed, were unique to the production of VX; growth media procured for biological agent production (enough to produce over three times the 8,500 liters of anthrax spores Iraq admits to having manufactured); over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

8. The departure of UNSCOM meant that the international community was unable to establish the truth behind these large discrepancies and greatly diminished its ability to monitor and assess Iraq’s continuing attempts to reconstitute its programs.

CHAPTER 3: THE CURRENT POSITION: 1998–2002

This chapter sets out what we know of Saddam Hussein’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs, drawing on all the available evidence. While it takes account of the results from UN inspections and other publicly available information, it also draws heavily on the latest intelligence about Iraqi efforts to develop their programs and capabilities since 1998. The main conclusions are that: Iraq has a useable chemical and biological weapons capability, in breach of UNSCR 687, which has included recent production of chemical and biological agents; Saddam continues to attach great importance to the possession of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles which he regards as being the basis for Iraq’s regional power. He is determined to retain these capabilities; Iraq can deliver chemical and biological agents using an extensive range of artillery shells, free-fall bombs, sprayers and ballistic missiles; Iraq continues to work on developing nuclear weapons, in breach of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in breach of UNSCR 687. Uranium has been sought from Africa that has no civil nuclear application in Iraq; Iraq possesses extended-range versions of the SCUD ballistic missile in breach of UNSCR 687 which are capable of reaching Cyprus, Eastern Turkey, Tehran and Israel. It is also developing longer-range ballistic missiles; Iraq’s current military planning specifically envisages the use of chemical and biological weapons; Iraq’s military forces are able to use chemical and biological weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. The Iraqi military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so; Iraq has learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and is already taking steps to conceal and disperse sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return of inspectors; Iraq’s chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missiles programs are well-funded.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002

Since the withdrawal of the inspectors the JIC has monitored evidence, including from secret intelligence, of continuing work on Iraqi offensive chemical and biological warfare capabilities. In the first half of 2000 the JIC noted intelligence on Iraqi attempts to procure dual-use chemicals and on the reconstruction of civil chemical production at sites formerly associated with the chemical warfare programmed. Iraq had also been trying to procure dual-use materials and equipment which could be used for a biological warfare programmed. Personnel known to have been connected to the biological warfare programmed up to the Gulf War had been conducting research into pathogens. There was intelligence that Iraq was starting to produce biological warfare agents in mobile production facilities. Planning for the project had begun in 1995 under Dr Rihab Taha, known to have been a central player in the pre-Gulf War programmed. The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material to produce biological warfare agents within weeks using its legitimate bio-technology facilities.

In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agent within months. The JIC concluded that intelligence on Iraqi former chemical and biological warfare facilities, their limited reconstruction and civil production pointed to a continuing research and development programmed. These chemical and biological capabilities represented the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Since 1998 Iraqi development of mass destruction weaponry had been helped by the absence of inspectors and the increase in illegal border trade, which was providing hard currency.

In the last six months the JIC has confirmed its earlier judgments on Iraqi chemical and biological warfare capabilities and assessed that Iraq has the means to deliver chemical and biological weapons.

Recent intelligence

Subsequently, intelligence has become available from reliable sources which complements and adds to previous intelligence and confirms the JIC assessment that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence also shows that the Iraqi leadership has been discussing a number of issues related to these weapons. This intelligence covers: Confirmation that chemical and biological weapons play an important role in Iraqi military thinking: intelligence shows that Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of chemical and biological weapons which he regards as being the basis for Iraqi regional power. He believes that respect for Iraq rests on its possession of these weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them. Intelligence indicates that Saddam is determined to retain this capability and recognizes that Iraqi political weight would be diminished if Iraq’s military power rested solely on its conventional military forces. Iraqi attempts to retain its existing banned weapons systems: Iraq is already taking steps to prevent UN weapons inspectors finding evidence of 18 its chemical and biological weapons programmed. Intelligence indicates that Saddam has learnt lessons from previous weapons inspections, has identified possible weak points in the inspections process and knows how to exploit them. Sensitive equipment and papers can easily be concealed and in some cases this is already happening. The possession of mobile biological agent production facilities will also aid concealment efforts. Saddam is determined not to lose the capabilities that he has been able to develop further in the four years since inspectors left. Saddam’s willingness to use chemical and biological weapons: intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq’s military planning Saddam is willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.

Chemical and biological agents: surviving stocks

When confronted with questions about the unaccounted stocks, Iraq has claimed repeatedly that if it had retained any chemical agents from before the Gulf War they would have deteriorated sufficiently to render them harmless. But Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having the knowledge and capability to add stabilizer to nerve agent and other chemical warfare agents which would prevent such decomposition. In 1997 UNSCOM also examined some munitions which had been filled with mustard gas prior to 1991 and found that they remained very toxic and showed little sign of deterioration.

Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed. No convincing proof of any kind has been produced to support this claim. In particular, Iraq could not explain large discrepancies between the amount of growth media (nutrients required for the specialized growth of agent) it procured before 1991 and the amounts of agent it admits to having manufactured. The discrepancy is enough to produce more than three times the amount of anthrax allegedly manufactured.

Chemical agent: production capabilities

Intelligence shows that Iraq has continued to produce chemical agent. During the Gulf War a number of facilities which intelligence reporting indicated were directly or indirectly associated with Iraq’s chemical weapons effort were

attacked and damaged. Following the ceasefire UNSCOM destroyed or rendered harmless facilities and equipment used in Iraq’s chemical weapons programmed. Other equipment was released for civilian use either in industry or academic institutes, where it was tagged and regularly inspected and monitored, or else placed under camera monitoring, to ensure that it was not being misused. This monitoring ceased when UNSCOM withdrew from Iraq in 1998. However, capabilities remain and, although the main chemical weapon production facility at al-Muthanna was completely destroyed by UNSCOM and has not been rebuilt, other plants formerly associated with the chemical warfare programmed have been rebuilt. These include the chlorine and phenol plant at Fallujah 2 near Habbaniyah. In addition to their civilian uses, chlorine and phenol are used for precursor chemicals which contribute to the production of chemical agents.

Other dual-use facilities, which are capable of being used to support the production of chemical agent and precursors, have been rebuilt and re-equipped. New chemical facilities have been built, some with illegal foreign assistance, and are probably fully operational or ready for production. These include the Ibn Sina Company at Tarmiyah (see figure 1), which is a chemical research center. It undertakes research, development and production of chemicals previously imported but not now available and which are needed for Iraq’s civil industry. The Director General of the research center is Hikmat Na’im al-Jalu who prior to the Gulf War worked in Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmed and after the war was responsible for preserving Iraq’s chemical expertise.

Parts of the al-Qa’qa’ chemical complex damaged in the Gulf War have also been repaired and are operational. Of particular concern are elements of the phosgene production plant at al-Qa’qa’. These were severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt. While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for nerve agent.

Iraq has retained the expertise for chemical warfare research, agent production and weaponization. Most of the personnel previously involved in the programmed remain in country. While UNSCOM found a number of technical manuals (so called “cook books”) for the production of chemical agents and critical precursors, Iraq’s claim to have unilaterally destroyed the bulk of the documentation cannot be confirmed and is almost certainly untrue. Recent intelligence indicates that Iraq is still discussing methods of concealing such documentation in order to ensure that it is not discovered by any future UN inspections.

The Problem of Dual-Use Facilities

Almost all components and supplies used in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs are dual-use. For example, any major petrochemical or biotech industry, as well as public health organizations, will have legitimate need for most materials and equipment required to manufacture chemical and biological weapons. Without UN weapons inspectors it is very difficult therefore to be sure about the true nature of many of Iraq’s facilities. For example, Iraq has built a large new chemical complex, Project Baiji, in the desert in north west Iraq at al-Sharqat (see figure 2). This site is a former uranium enrichment facility which was damaged during the Gulf War and rendered harmless under supervision of the IAEA. Part of the site has been rebuilt, with work starting in 1992, as a chemical production complex. Despite the site being far away from populated areas it is surrounded by a high wall with watch towers and guarded by armed guards. Intelligence reports indicate that it will produce nitric acid which can be used in explosives, missile fuel and in the purification of uranium.

Biological agent: production capabilities

We know from intelligence that Iraq has continued to produce biological warfare agents. As with some chemical equipment, UNSCOM only destroyed equipment that could be directly linked to biological weapons production. Iraq also has its own engineering capability to design and construct biological agent associated fermenters, centrifuges, sprayer dryers and other equipment and is judged to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons. The experienced personnel who were active in the programmed have largely remained in the country. Some dual-use equipment has also been purchased, but without monitoring by UN inspectors Iraq could have diverted it to their biological weapons programmed. This newly purchased equipment and other equipment previously subject to monitoring could be used in a resurgent biological warfare programmed. Facilities of concern include: the Castor Oil Production Plant at Fallujah: this was damaged in UK/US air attacks in 1998 (Operation Desert Fox) but has been rebuilt. The residue from the castor bean pulp can be used in the production of the biological agent ricin; the al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute: which was involved in biological agent production and research before the Gulf War; the Amariyah Sera and Vaccine Plant at Abu Ghraib: UNSCOM established that this facility was used to store biological agents, seed stocks and conduct biological warfare associated genetic research prior to the Gulf War. It has now expanded its storage capacity.

UNSCOM established that Iraq considered the use of mobile biological agent production facilities. In the past two years evidence from defectors has indicated the existence of such facilities. Recent intelligence confirms that the Iraqi military have developed mobile facilities. These would help Iraq conceal and protect biological agent production from military attack or UN inspection.

Chemical and biological agents: delivery means

Iraq has a variety of delivery means available for both chemical and biological agents. These include: free-fall bombs: Iraq acknowledged to UNSCOM the deployment to two sites of free-fall bombs filled with biological agent during 1990–91. These bombs were filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also acknowledged possession of four types of aerial bomb with various chemical agent fills including sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin and cyclosarin; artillery shells and rockets: Iraq made extensive use of artillery munitions filled with chemical agents during the Iran-Iraq War. Mortars can also be used for chemical agent delivery. Iraq is known to have tested the use of shells and rockets filled with biological agents. Over 20,000 artillery munitions remain unaccounted for by UNSCOM; helicopter and aircraft borne sprayers: Iraq carried out studies into aerosol dissemination of biological agent using these platforms prior to 1991. UNSCOM was unable to account for many of these devices. It is probable that Iraq retains a capability for aerosol dispersal of both chemical and biological agent over a large area; al-Hussein ballistic missiles (range 650km): Iraq told UNSCOM that it filled 25 warheads with anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. Iraq also developed chemical agent warheads for al-Hussein. Iraq admitted to producing 50 chemical warheads for al-Hussein which were intended for the delivery of a mixture of sarin and cyclosarin. However, technical analysis of warhead remnants has shown traces of VX degradation product which indicate that some additional warheads were made and filled with VX; al-Samoud/Ababil-100 ballistic missiles (range 150km plus): it is unclear if chemical and biological warheads have been developed for these systems, but given the Iraqi experience on other missile systems, we judge that Iraq has the technical expertise for doing so;

L-29 remotely piloted vehicle programmed (see figure 3): we know from intelligence that Iraq has attempted to modify the L-

29 jet trainer to allow it to be used as an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) which is potentially capable of delivering chemical and biological agents over a large area.

FIGURE 3: THE L-29 JET TRAINER

Chemical and biological warfare: command and control

The authority to use chemical and biological weapons ultimately resides with Saddam but intelligence indicates that he may have also delegated this authority to his son Qusai. Special Security Organization (SSO) and Special Republican Guard (SRG) units would be involved in the movement of any chemical and biological weapons to military units. The Iraqi military holds artillery and missile systems at Corps level throughout the Armed Forces and conducts regular training with them. The Directorate of Rocket Forces has operational control of strategic missile systems and some Multiple Launcher Rocket Systems.

Chemical and biological weapons: summary

Intelligence shows that Iraq has covert chemical and biological weapons programs, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687 and has continued to produce chemical and biological agents. Iraq has: chemical and biological agents and weapons available, both from pre-Gulf War stocks and more recent production; the capability to produce the chemical agents mustard gas, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX capable of producing mass casualties; a biological agent production capability and can produce at least anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Iraq has also developed mobile facilities to produce biological agents; a variety of delivery means available; military forces, which maintain the capability to use these weapons with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessments: 1999–2001

Since 1999 the JIC has monitored Iraq’s attempts to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programmed. In mid-2001 the JIC assessed that Iraq had continued its nuclear research after 1998. The JIC drew attention to intelligence that Iraq had recalled its nuclear scientists to the programmed in 1998. Since 1998 Iraq had been trying to procure items that could be for use in the construction of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.

Iraqi nuclear weapons expertise

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Chapter 2 describe the Iraqi nuclear weapons programmed prior to the Gulf War. It is clear from IAEA inspections and Iraq’s own declarations that by 1991 considerable progress had been made in both developing methods to produce fissile material and in weapons design. The IAEA dismantled the physical infrastructure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, including the dedicated facilities and equipment for uranium separation and enrichment, and for weapon development and production, and removed the remaining highly enriched uranium. But Iraq retained, and retains, many of its experienced nuclear scientists and technicians who are specialized in the production of fissile material and weapons design. Intelligence indicates that Iraq also retains the accompanying program documentation and data.

Elements of a nuclear weapons program: nuclear fission weapon

A typical nuclear fission weapon consists of: fissile material for the core which gives out huge amounts of explosive energy from nuclear reactions when made “super critical” through extreme compression. Fissile material is usually either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or weapons-grade plutonium: HEU can be made in gas centrifuges. Plutonium is made by reprocessing fuel from a nuclear reactor; explosives which are needed to compress the nuclear core. These explosives also require a complex arrangement of detonators, explosive charges to produce an even and rapid compression of the core; sophisticated electronics to fire the explosives; a neutron initiator to provide initial burst of neutrons to start the nuclear reactions.

Weaponization

Weaponization is the conversion of these concepts into a reliable weapon. It includes: developing a weapon design through sophisticated science and complex calculations; engineering design to integrate with the delivery system; specialized equipment to cast and machine safely the nuclear core; dedicated facilities to assemble the warheads; facilities to rigorously test all individual components and designs; The complexity is much greater for a weapon that can fit into a missile warhead than for a larger Nagasaki-type bomb.

Intelligence shows that the present Iraqi program is almost certainly seeking an indigenous ability to enrich uranium to the level needed for a nuclear weapon. It indicates that the approach is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, one of the routes Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. But Iraq needs certain key equipment, including gas centrifuge components and components for the production of fissile material before a nuclear bomb could be developed.

Gas centrifuge uranium enrichment

Uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride is separated into its different isotopes in rapidly spinning rotor tubes of special centrifuges. Many hundreds or thousands of centrifuges are connected in cascades to enrich uranium. If the lighter U235 isotope is enriched to more than 90% it can be used in the core of a nuclear weapon.

Following the departure of weapons inspectors in 1998 there has been an accumulation of intelligence indicating that Iraq is making concerted covert efforts to acquire dual-use technology and materials with nuclear applications. Iraq’s known holdings of processed uranium are under IAEA supervision. But there is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Iraq has no active civil nuclear power programmed or nuclear power plants and therefore has no legitimate reason to acquire uranium.

Iraq’s civil nuclear program

Iraq’s long-standing civil nuclear power programmed is limited to small scale research. Activities that could be used for military purposes are prohibited by UNSCR 687 and 715.Iraq has no nuclear power plants and therefore no requirement for uranium as fuel. Iraq has a number of nuclear research programs in the fields of agriculture, biology, chemistry, materials and pharmaceuticals. None of these activities requires more than tiny amounts of uranium which Iraq could supply from its own resources.Iraq’s research reactors are non-operational; two were bombed and one was never completed.

Intelligence shows that other important procurement activity since 1998 has included attempts to purchase: vacuum pumps which could be used to create and maintain pressures in a gas centrifuge cascade needed to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line of the correct specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges. It appears that Iraq is attempting to acquire a capability to produce them on its own rather than rely on foreign procurement; Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF) and fluorine gas. AHF is commonly used in the petrochemical industry and Iraq frequently imports significant amounts, but it is also used in the process of converting uranium into uranium hexafluoride for use in gas centrifuge cascades; one large filament winding machine which could be used to manufacture carbon fiber gas centrifuge rotors; a large balancing machine which could be used in initial centrifuge balancing work.

Iraq has also made repeated attempts covertly to acquire a very large quantity (60,000 or more) of specialized aluminum tubes. The specialized aluminum in question is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in the construction of gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium, although there is no definitive intelligence that it is destined for a nuclear program.

Nuclear weapons: timelines

In early 2002, the JIC assessed that UN sanctions on Iraq were hindering the import of crucial goods for the production of fissile material. The JIC judged that while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or prove ineffective, it would take Iraq at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously. However, we know that Iraq retains expertise and design data relating to nuclear weapons. We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) Assessment: 1999–2002

In mid-2001 the JIC drew attention to what it described as a “step-change” in progress on the Iraqi missile programmed over the previous two years. It was clear from intelligence that the range of Iraqi missiles which was permitted by the UN and supposedly limited to 150kms was being extended and that work was under way on larger engines for longer-range missiles.

In early 2002 the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of over 1,000kms. The JIC assessed that if sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile before 2007. Sanctions and the earlier work of the inspectors had caused significant problems for Iraqi missile development. In the previous six months Iraqi foreign procurement efforts for the missile programmed had been bolder. The JIC also assessed that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles from before the Gulf War.

The Iraqi ballistic missile programmed since 1998

Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolo Council Resolution 687. The al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested and is being deployed to military units. Intelligence indicates that at least 50 have been produced. Intelligence also indicates that Iraq has worked on extending its range to at least 200km in breach of UN Security Resolution 687. Production of the solid propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 4) is also underway, probably as an unguided rocket at this stage. There are also plans to extend its range to at least 200km. Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods.

FIGURE 4:ABABIL-100

According to intelligence, Iraq has retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles (Figure 5), in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687. These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be maintained effectively, although the fact that at least some require re-assembly makes it difficult to judge exactly how many could be available for use. They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.

FIGURE 5: AL-HUSSEIN

Intelligence has confirmed that Iraq wants to extend the range of its missile systems to over 1000km, enabling it to threaten other regional neighbors. This work began in 1998, although efforts to regenerate the long-range ballistic missile programmed probably began in 1995. Iraq’s missile programs employ hundreds of people. Satellite imagery (Figure 6) has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for al-Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision. This new stand will be capable of testing engines for medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. Such a facility would not be needed for systems that fall within the UN permitted range of 150km. The Iraqis have recently taken measures to conceal activities at this site. Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy.

The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on the: availability of foreign expertise; conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km; acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. Even if sanctions remain effective, Iraq might achieve a missile capability of over 1000km within 5 years (Figure 7 shows the range of Iraq’s various missiles).

Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998 (see Part 2). New missile-related infrastructure is also under construction. Some aspects of this, including rocket propellant mixing and casting facilities at the al-Mamoun Plant, appear to replicate those linked to the prohibited Badr-2000 programmed (with a planned range of 700–1000km) which were destroyed in the Gulf War or dismantled by UNSCOM. A new plant at al-Mamoun for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors, has also been constructed. This has been provided illicitly by NEC Engineers Private Limited, an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq, including to other suspect facilities such as the Fallujah 2 chlorine plant. After an extensive investigation, the Indian authorities have recently suspended its export license, although other individuals and companies are still illicitly procuring for Iraq.

Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051. The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, such as requests to buy magnesium powder and ammonium chloride. But we know from intelligence that some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programmed. More will inevitably continue to do so. Intelligence makes it clear that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for Iraq’s ballistic missiles. This includes production level quantities of near complete sets of solid propellant rocket motor ingredients such as aluminum powder, ammonium perchlorate and hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene. There have also been attempts to acquire large quantities of liquid propellant chemicals such as Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and diethylenetriamene. We judge these are intended to support production and deployment of the al-Samoud and development of longer-range systems.

FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAM

The UN has sought to restrict Iraq’s ability to generate funds for its chemical, biological and other military programs. For example, Iraq earns money legally under the UN Oil For Food Programmed (OFF) established by UNSCR 986, whereby the proceeds of oil sold through the UN are used to buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq. This money remains under UN control and cannot be used for military procurement. However, the Iraqi regime continues to generate income outside UN control either in the form of hard currency or barter goods (which in turn means existing Iraqi funds are freed up to be spent on other things).

UN Sanctions

UN sanctions on Iraq prohibit all imports to and exports from Iraq. The UN must clear any goods entering or leaving. The UN also administers the Oil for Food (OFF) programmed. Any imports entering Iraq under the OFF programmed are checked against the Goods Review List for potential military or weapons of mass destruction utility.

These illicit earnings go to the Iraqi regime. They are used for building new palaces, as well as purchasing luxury goods and other civilian goods outside the OFF programmed. Some of these funds are also used by Saddam Hussein to maintain his armed forces, and to develop or acquire military equipment, including for chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs. We do not know what proportion of these funds is used in this way. But we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass destruction and its ballistic missile programmed, for example through covert procurement of equipment from abroad, has been inhibited in any way by lack of funds. The steady increase over the last three years in the availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress the programs faster.

HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS

During the 1990s, beginning in April 1991 immediately after the end of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions establishing the authority of UNSCOM and the IAEA to carry out the work of dismantling Iraq’s arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and long-range ballistic missiles. These resolutions were passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is the instrument that allows the UN Security Council to authorize the use of military force to enforce its resolutions.

UN Security Council Resolutions relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, “the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision” of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programs, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmed. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so. UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its programs for weapons of mass destruction and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. For over a decade Iraq has been in breach of this resolution. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes. UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) arrangements to implement UNSCR 687. Iraq did not accede to this until November 1993. OMV was conducted from April 1995 to 15 December 1998, when the UN left Iraq. UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use goods which could be used for mass destruction weaponry programs.

As outlined in UNSCR 687, Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs were also a breach of Iraq’s commitments under: . The 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons; the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.

UNSCR 687 obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction programs within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programs, and all ballistic missiles with a range beyond 150km. Iraq did not make a satisfactory declaration within the specified time-frame. Iraq accepted the UNSCRs and agreed to co-operate with UNSCOM. The history of the UN weapons inspections was characterized by persistent Iraqi obstruction.

Iraqi Non-Co-operation with the Inspectors

The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council in January 1999 that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high level Iraqi Government committee to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions: to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least modern; to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programs when possible; to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programmed, including the VX nerve agent project; to conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range missiles; and to conceal the existence of its biological weapons programmed.

In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites, “Presidential” and “sovereign”, from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors would henceforth be barred. The terms of the ceasefire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation. However, Iraq consistently refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors access to any of these eight Presidential sites. Many of these so-called “palaces” are in fact large compounds which are an integral part of Iraqi counter-measures designed to hide weapons material.

Iraq’s policy of deception

Iraq has admitted to UNSCOM to having a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and possibly biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA. The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs. The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai. The system for hiding proscribed material relies on high mobility and good command and control. It uses lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to be located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favored. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.

Intimidation

Once inspectors had arrived in Iraq, it quickly became apparent that the Iraqis would resort to a range of measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate. In response to such incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations.

Iraqi obstruction of UN weapons inspection teams

Firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991); keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmed (September 1991); announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were “unlawful” (October 1991); refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities; in 1991–2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans. In January 1993 it refused to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq; refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993); repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998); interfering with UNSCOM’s helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997); demanding the end of U2 over flights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997); destroying documentary evidence of programs for weapons of mass destruction (September 1997).

Obstruction

Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programmed until July 1995. In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussein Kamil, Saddam’s son-in-law and former Director of the Military Industrialization Commission, Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its mass destruction weaponry programs and acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programmed that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq admitted producing 183 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

Inspection of Iraq’s biological weapons programmed

In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq claimed that it had merely conducted a military biological research programmed. At the site visited, al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for weapons. The factory had also been sanitized by Iraqi officials to deceive inspectors. Iraq continued to develop the al-Hakam site into the 1990s, misleading UNSCOM about its true purpose. Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at al-Dawrah which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax was not divulged as part of the programmed. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tons of bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at al-Hakam. As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete. Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programmed and to obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programmed and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest. Monitoring teams were at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programmed. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of its programmed which were judged by UNSCOM and specially convened international panels to be technically inadequate. In late 1995 Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later, in early 1997, UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin.

Iraq tried to obstruct UNSCOM’s efforts to investigate the scale of its biological weapons programmed. It created forged documents to account for bacterial growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities. Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.

Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of agent and subsequent weaponization. Iraq destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons impossible. In addition, Iraq cleansed a key site at al-Muthanna, its main research and development, production and weaponization facility for chemical warfare agents, of all evidence of a biological programmed in the toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.

Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programmed during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics. In July 1998 Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process stating that the biological programmed was more secret and more closed than other mass destruction weaponry programs. He also played down the significance of the programmed. Iraq has presented the biological weapons programmed as the personal undertaking of a few misguided scientists.

At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programmed via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997 the IAEA Director General stated that the IAEA was “severely hampered by Iraq’s persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the program's scope”.

Inspection achievements

Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and exposing Iraq’s biological weapons programmed and destroying very large quantities of chemical weapons stocks and missiles as well as the infrastructure for Iraq’s nuclear weapons programmed.

Despite UNSCOM’s efforts, following the effective ejection of UN inspectors in December 1998 there remained a series of significant unresolved disarmament issues. In summarizing the situation in a report to the UN Security Council, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, indicated that: contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision “Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items”; and Iraq “also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions”. Overall, Richard Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had “a significant impact upon the Commission’s disarmament work”.

Withdrawal of the inspectors

By the end of 1998 UNSCOM was in direct confrontation with the Iraqi Government which was refusing to co-operate. The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action unavoidable. Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and stated that, following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate. As a direct result on 16 December the weapons inspectors were withdrawn. Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK a few hours afterwards.

Operation Desert Fox (16–19 December 1998)

Operation Desert Fox targeted industrial facilities related to Iraq’s ballistic missile programmed and a suspect biological warfare facility as well as military airfields and sites used by Iraq’s security organizations which are involved in its weapons of mass destruction programs. Key facilities associated with Saddam Hussein’s ballistic missile programmed were significantly degraded.

The situation since 1998

There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1284 in December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organization to UNSCOM and called on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport”. It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take in return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions. A key measure of Iraqi compliance would be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites, personnel and documents.

For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of nuclear material (depleted natural and low-enriched uranium). This has led some countries and western commentators to conclude erroneously that Iraq is meeting its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does “not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council”.

Dr Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr Mohammed El- Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations. In April 1999 an independent UN panel of experts noted that “the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programs”. The departure of the inspectors greatly diminished the ability of the international community to monitor and assess Iraq’s continuing attempts to reconstitute its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

PART 3: IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

Introduction

The Republic of Iraq is bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and the Persian Gulf. Its population of around 23 million is ethnically and religiously diverse. Approximately 77% are Arabs. Sunni Muslims form around 17% of the Arab population and dominate the government. About 60% of Iraqis are Shias and 20% are Kurds. The remaining 3% of the population consists of Assyrians, Turkomans, Armenians, Christians and Yazidis.

Saddam Hussein’s rise to power

Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 in the Tikrit district, north of Baghdad. In 1957 he joined the Ba’ath Party. After taking part in a failed attempt to assassinate the Iraqi President, Abdul Karim Qasim, Saddam escaped, first to Syria and then to Egypt. In his absence he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Saddam returned to Baghdad in 1963 when the Ba’ath Party came to power. He went into hiding after the Ba’ath fell from power later that year. He was captured and imprisoned, but in 1967 escaped and took over responsibility for Ba’ath security. Saddam set about imposing his will on the Party and establishing himself at the center of power. The Ba’ath Party returned to power in 1968. In 1969 Saddam became Vice- Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Deputy to the President, and Deputy Secretary General of the Regional Command of the Ba’ath. In 1970 he joined the Party’s National Command and in 1977 was elected Assistant Secretary General. In July 1979, he took over the Presidency of Iraq. Within days, five fellow members of the Revolutionary Command Council were accused of involvement in a coup attempt. They and 17 others were summarily executed. Public life in Iraq is nominally dominated by the Ba’ath Party. But all real authority rests with Saddam and his immediate circle. Saddam’s family, tribe and a small number of associates remain his most loyal supporters. He uses them to convey his orders, including to members of the government.

Saddam uses patronage and violence to motivate his supporters and to control or eliminate opposition. Potential rewards include social status, money and better access to goods. Saddam’s extensive security apparatus and Ba’ath Party network provides oversight of Iraqi society, with informants in social, government and military organizations. Saddam practices torture, execution and other forms of coercion against his enemies, real or suspected. His targets are not only those who have offended him, but also their families, friends or colleagues.

The Iraqi Ba’ath Party

The Ba’ath Party is the only legal political party in Iraq. It pervades all aspects of Iraqi life. Membership, around 700,000, is necessary for self advancement and confers benefits from the regime. Saddam acts to ensure that there are no other centers of power in Iraq. He has crushed parties and ethnic groups, such as the communists and the Kurds, which might try to assert themselves. Members of the opposition abroad have been the targets of assassination attempts conducted by Iraqi security services.

Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus

Saddam relies on a long list of security organizations with overlapping responsibilities. The main ones are: . The Special Security Organization oversees Saddam’s security and monitors the loyalty of other security services. Its recruits are predominantly from Tikrit. The Special Republican Guard is equipped with the best available military equipment. Its members are selected on the basis of loyalty to the regime. The Directorate of General Security is primarily responsible for countering threats from the civilian population. The Directorate of General Intelligence monitors and suppresses dissident activities at home and abroad. The Directorate of Military Intelligence’s role includes the investigation of military personnel. The Saddam Fidayeen, under the control of Saddam’s son Udayy, has been used to deal with civil disturbances.

Army officers are an important part of the Iraqi government’s network of informers. Suspicion that officers have ambitions other than the service of the President leads to immediate execution. It is routine for Saddam to take preemptive action against those who he believes might conspire against him.

Internal Repression – the Kurds and the Shias

Saddam has pursued a long-term programmed of persecution of the Iraqi Kurds, including through the use of chemical weapons. During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam appointed his cousin, Ali Hasan al-Majid, as his deputy in the north. In 1987-88, al-Majid led the “Anfal” campaign of attacks on Kurdish villages. Amnesty International estimates that more than 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during this period. Repression and control: some examples. A campaign of mass arrests and killing of Shia activists led to the execution of the Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr and his sister in April 1980. In 1983 80 members of another leading Shia family were arrested. Six of them, all religious leaders, were executed. A massive chemical weapons attack on Kurds in Halabja town in March 1988 killing 5000 and injuring 10,000 more. A large number of officers from the Jabbur tribe were executed in the early 1990s for the alleged disloyalty of a few of them.

After the Gulf War in 1991 Kurds in the north of Iraq rose up against Baghdad’s rule. In response the Iraqi regime killed or imprisoned thousands, prompting a humanitarian crisis. Over a million Kurds fled into the mountains and tried to escape Iraq. Persecution of Iraq’s Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has helped to curb the worst excesses. But outside this zone the Baghdad regime has continued a policy of persecution and intimidation. The regime has used chemical weapons against the Kurds, most notably in an attack on the town of Halabja in 1988 (see Part 1 Chapter 2 paragraph 9). The implicit threat of the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and others is an important part of Saddam’s attempt to keep the civilian population under control. The regime has tried to displace the traditional Kurdish and Turkoman populations of the areas under its control, primarily in order to weaken Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the northern city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly ejected to the three northern Iraqi governorates, Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah, which are under de facto Kurdish control. According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq, 94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991. Agricultural land owned by Kurds has been confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area.

After the 1979 revolution that ousted the Shah in Iran, Saddam intensified a campaign against the Shia Muslim majority of Iraq, fearing that they might be encouraged by the new Shia regime in Iran. 12. On 1 March 1991, in the wake of the Gulf War, riots broke out in the southern city of Basra, spreading quickly to other cities in Shia-dominated southern Iraq. The regime responded by killing thousands. Many Shia tried to escape to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Some of the Shia hostile to the regime sought refuge in the marshland of southern Iraq. In order to subjugate the area, Saddam embarked on a large-scale programmed to drain the marshes to allow Iraqi ground forces to eliminate all opposition there. The rural population of the area fled or were forced to move to southern cities or across the border into Iran.

Saddam Hussein’s Wars

As well as ensuring his absolute control inside Iraq, Saddam has tried to make Iraq the dominant power of the region. In pursuit of these objectives he has led Iraq into two wars of aggression against neighbors, the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait. With the fall of the Shah in Iran in 1979, relations between Iran and Iraq deteriorated sharply. In September 1980 Saddam renounced a border treaty he had agreed with Iran in 1975 ceding half of the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iran. Shortly thereafter, Saddam launched a large-scale invasion of Iran. He believed that he could take advantage of the state of weakness, isolation and disorganization he perceived in post-revolutionary Iran. He aimed to seize territory, including that ceded to Iran a few years earlier, and to assert Iraq’s position as a leader of the Arab world. Saddam expected it to be a short, sharp campaign. But the conflict lasted for eight years. Iraq fired over 500 ballistic missiles at Iranian targets, including major cities. It is estimated that the Iran-Iraq war cost the two sides a million casualties. Iraq used chemical weapons extensively from 1984. Some twenty thousand Iranians were killed by mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and sarin, all of which Iraq still possesses. The UN Security Council considered the report prepared by a team of three specialists appointed by the UN Secretary General in March 1986, following which the President made a statement condemning Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This marked the first time a country had been named for violating the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons.

The cost of the war ran into hundreds of billions of dollars for both sides. Iraq gained nothing. After the war ended, Saddam resumed his previous pursuit of primacy in the Gulf. His policies involved spending huge sums of money on new military equipment. But Iraq was burdened by debt incurred during the war and the price of oil, Iraq’s only major export, was low. By 1990 Iraq’s financial problems were severe. Saddam looked at ways to press the oil-producing states of the Gulf to force up the price of crude oil by limiting production and waive the $40 billion that they had loaned Iraq during its war with Iran. Kuwait had made some concessions over production ceilings. But Saddam blamed Kuwait for over-production. When his threats and blandishments failed, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. He believed that occupying Kuwait could prove profitable. Saddam also sought to justify the conquest of Kuwait on other grounds. Like other Iraqi leaders before him, he claimed that, as Kuwait’s rulers had come under the jurisdiction of the governors of Basra in the time of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait should belong to Iraq. During its occupation of Kuwait, Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty was imposed for relatively minor “crimes” such as looting and hoarding food.

In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime took hostage several hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait and prevented thousands more from leaving, in direct contravention of international humanitarian law. Hostages were held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian sites. At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells with serious environmental consequences.

More than 600 Kuwaiti and other prisoners of war and missing persons are still unaccounted for. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to close only three case-files.

Abuse of human rights

This section draws on reports of human rights abuses from authoritative international organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Human rights abuses continue within Iraq. People continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities or often because they are related to members of the opposition. Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic practice. Thousands of prisoners have been executed. Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties for criminal offences. These include amputation, branding, cutting off ears, and other forms of mutilation. Anyone found guilty of slandering the President has their tongue removed.

Saddam Hussein’s family

Saddam’s son Udayy maintained a private torture chamber known as the Red Room in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. He created a militia in 1994 which has used swords to execute victims outside their own homes. He has personally executed dissidents, for instance in the Shia uprising at Basra which followed the Gulf War. Members of Saddam’s family are also subject to persecution. A cousin of Saddam, Ala Abd al-Qadir al-Majid, fled to Jordan from Iraq citing disagreements with the regime over business matters. He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Directorate of General Intelligence (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by Ali Hasan al-Majid. At the farm Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him. Some 40 of Saddam’s relatives, including women and children, have been killed. His sons-in-law Hussein and Saddam Kamil had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the Iraqi government had announced amnesties for them. They were executed in February 1996.